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For over two years, a research team at the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
has been studying the likely impact of the UK leaving the European Union. Their latest
report focuses on the impact of ‘Brexit’ through changing trade patterns. Under
‘optimistic’ assumptions, there is a fall in national income of 1.3 per cent (about £850
per household). Under ‘pessimistic’ assumptions, this doubles to 2.6 per cent. When
the dynamic effects of higher trade costs on productivity are included, the cost may rise
to between 6.3 per cent and 9.5 per cent in the long run.
There are many issues that will weigh in the minds of voters in the run up to the 23rd
June EU referendum. Many people feel that they are oppressed by a remote,
undemocratic super-state that can over-rule British laws. Others believe that the EU
promotes better co-operation between communities that were at war for centuries. These views often stem from
deeply held political and moral beliefs.
Economics can make a small contribution to the debate by considering what might be the material costs and
benefits of leaving the EU. If there are economic benefits, then for Eurosceptics it’s a win-win. On the other hand, if
there are economic costs to Brexit, then even a die-hard Leaver must consider whether the price is too high. Some
might be prepared to pay any cost, for them it is ‘death before enslavement’. To most people however, it’s not so all-
or-nothing. They will look at the likely costs and benefits, and this will help inform their decision.
Figuring out the economic costs and benefits of Brexit
An obvious benefit of Brexit is that the UK will not have to send so much money to Brussels. On net this is
around 0.31 per cent of our national income. An equally obvious cost of Brexit is that trade between the UK and EU
will be lower if the UK leaves than if it stays. The degree to which trade costs will be higher outside the EU is a big
question. But it’s a fact that even when countries have comprehensive trade deals (such as Norway’s deal in the
European Economic Area, EEA) there are still non-tariff barriers due to regulatory differences, border checks, rule-
of-origin requirements and anti-dumping actions. This is why even Norway has been found to have less trade with
the EU than would be expected from such a deep level of integration.
There are a rich menu of economic models to analyse the impact of trade arrangements, but it turns out that most of
them have a pretty similar structure when it comes to thinking about welfare gains. Our work develops a state-of-
the-art (but bog-standard) trade model plus industry-level data on exports and imports covering all sectors of the
economy in every country in the world. This, plus an estimate of how trade responds to costs, enables us to figure
out how trade patterns and living standards will change when trade costs (tariff and non-tariff barriers) change after
Brexit.
Since it is hard to know precisely how trade costs will change after Brexit, we look at two stark scenarios. An
‘optimistic’ scenario is that the UK swiftly strikes a deal so that it gets deep access to the EU single market, like
Norway. A ‘pessimistic’ scenario is that the UK is unwilling to accept the free movement of labour and the associated
regulations that are part of the ‘access price’ to the single market and so will prefer the usual EU external tariffs.
Trade will fall by more in this case.
The table shows the results of our analysis. There is a drop in income per person of 1.3 per cent in the optimistic
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case, which doubles to 2.6 per cent in the pessimistic case. This translates to a fall of between £850 and £1,700 per
UK household.
Source: CEP calculations (Technical details available here). Income based on allocating GDP
loss per household. For example, 1.3 per cent of UK GDP is £23 billion and there are about
27 million households.
 
Is the pessimistic scenario too optimistic? Probably yes
The calculations we make are very narrow. They assume away any positive effects that trade may have on
productivity through more competition, innovation, foreign investment and migration. We also abstract away from the
economic damage induced by the policy uncertainty in the very difficult negotiating period following a Brexit vote.
Negotiations over new trade agreements could stretch over many years.
An alternative ‘back of the envelope’ way to estimate the effects of Brexit is to look at what actually happens when
countries joined the EU compared with being in free trade areas like the European Free Trade Area or EEA. The
trade effects are big – a jump of a quarter or more. Combining this with estimates of the impact of trade on GDP
from real falls in trade costs leads to an implied fall of UK national income of between 6.3 per cent and 9.5 per cent.
Interestingly, this is squarely within the range of values that others have estimated have been the historical benefits
of the UK joining the EU of around 8 per cent to 10 per cent.
This tripling of the costs of trade loss are also consistent with the literature of economic research comparing the
actual benefits of trade liberalisation (big) with those predicted from static models like those presented here (much
smaller). Naturally, UK trade with the EU does not disappear in any scenario – there remains a ‘trade deal’ in all
cases. It is simply that there is less than it would have been had the UK remained a member.
It makes little sense to point to a decline in the EU’s share of total UK trade over the last decade as evidence that
the single market has ‘failed to reduce trade costs.’ This decade has witnessed the rapid growth of Asian trade
powerhouses as well as the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression. Britain’s trade with Europe
has increased since 2000, it’s just that trade with China has increased much faster.
Is the optimistic case too pessimistic?
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How could things turn out better? First, could the UK negotiate a sweetheart deal much better than Norway or
Switzerland have managed? This seems unlikely. About half of the UK’s exports go to the EU, whereas only 10 per
cent of the EU’s exports are destined for the UK, so the bargaining power is lopsided. What’s more, the EU will not
want to be seen to be offering generous rewards for leaving as this will encourage other members to try the same
trick. And in addition, all this assumes that everyone is behaving reasonably and rationally – unfortunately divorces
tend to be much messier. Kicking the EU when it is undergoing a major refugee crisis and a long-running monetary
crisis might provoke some very grumpy outcomes.
Second, could the UK strike better trade deals with non-EU countries like the United States, China and India than
with the EU? Although the UK will not have to compromise with other EU members when doing such deals, it cannot
offer access to the biggest single market in the world as the EU does (UK GDP is under a fifth of the size of the
single market).  The EU is in the final stages of negotiation with the United States and Japan on deals estimated to
raise GDP by 0.6 per cent. If the UK cannot replicate these deals (and the United States has stated it is not
interested in a UK-only deal), this will be a further income loss on top of the estimates here.
Finally, what about the promised bonfire of red-tape when we leave the EU? Being outside the EU would enable the
UK in principle to jettison some irritating regulations. But it’s worth bearing in mind that being in the EU has not
stopped the UK from having one of the most flexible product and labour markets in the OECD (behind only the
United States and sometimes Canada).
The real question is whether much better regulation will really be forthcoming after Brexit. We often hear by
Eurosceptics that “the 100 most burdensome EU regulations have been estimated to impose annual costs of £33.3
billion”. But what they neglect to mention is that the government impact assessments they cite also estimate that the
same 100 regulations bring benefits to Britain of £58.6 billion per year! It’s been argued that by getting rid only of
those regulations where costs are deemed to outweigh benefits, 0.9 per cent of GDP could be saved. About half of
this is estimated to come from the Renewable Energy Strategy and the Working Time Directive. It’s unclear that
tearing up these environmental and employment protections will be politically feasible or really as economically
beneficial in the long run as the impact assessments find.
Is Brexit a price worth paying?
Many people may decide that knocking a grand or two off their salary or pension is worthwhile to get Brussels off
their backs. Some – though probably fewer – might even say the same if the bill rises to over £6,000 a year. These
are reasonable positions and every voter will make up their own mind over the price they are willing to pay. But those
who say that leaving the EU is a win-win because Britons will both feel more free and become a lot richer are not
being candid about the evidence. The standard trade models given here, calculations from trade and income
differences of being in and out of the EU and also historical assessments show a consistent picture – Brexit will cost.
The only question is ‘exactly how much’?
Please note: This articles summarises the study ‘The consequences of Brexit for UK trade and living standards’. The
report has been attacked by Vote Leave. First, they say the report is EU funded. This is untrue: our work is funded
by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (as a whole, CEP receives less than 5 per cent of its funding
from the EU). Second, they say the authors lack credibility because we also supported Euro entry. This too is
untrue: Professor John Van Reenen, who has been CEP Director since 2003, has never supported the UK joining
the Euro. Vote Leave’s other points were all addressed by the original report and are amplified in the above piece.
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